





































Figure 1.  Underground coal mining methods of the 20th Century.
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COAL MINES (1948-1960):  A CAUTIONARY TALE
Christopher Mark, Chief, Rock Mechanics Section
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
Pittsburgh Research Laboratory
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania  USA
ABSTRACT
Perhaps the most significant development in coal mine ground
control during the last century was the introduction of roof bolting
during the late 1940’s and 1950’s.  From an engineering standpoint,
roof bolts are inherently more effective than the wood timbers they
replaced.  Roof bolts promised to dramatically reduce the number of
roof fall accidents, which then claimed hundreds of lives each year,
and they were initially hailed as “one of the great social advances of
our time.”  Roof bolting also emerged at a time of rapid technologic
transformation of the coal industry, and greatly accelerated the
transition to trackless, rubber-tired face haulage.
The U.S. Bureau of Mines quickly became the new roof support’s
strongest advocate.  Some state agencies and miners were skeptical
at first, but nearly everyone was soon won over.  Case histories were
reported showing that roof falls could be largely eliminated while
productivity increased dramatically.  Little wonder that, in the words
of one contemporary observer, “roof bolting has been adopted more
rapidly than any other new technology in the history of coal mine
mechanization.”
Yet by the end of the 1950’s, it was clear that roof fall fatality
incidence rates had actually increased.  It would be another decade
before the superior ground support provided by roof bolts would
clearly save lives.  The story of how roof bolting was implemented by
the mining industry, but took so long to live up to its promise, is a
fascinating example of the interaction between economics,
technology, regulation, and science.  It still has important lessons for
today.
INTRODUCTION
The 20th century was a time of continuous revolution in
underground coal mining technology.  At the beginning of the
century, traditional pick mining with hand loading was nearly
universal.  Undercutting machines had largely replaced picks by
1930, when mechanical loading began the first great transformation
of mining (figure 1)1.  Other revolutionary developments included the
replacement of drilling and blasting by continuous miners during the
50’s and 60’s and the rapid growth of longwall mining during the
1980’s.
These technological changes were accompanied by equally
dramatic developments in work organization, government regulation,
and mine safety.  Where the hand-loader worked independently and
seldom saw a foreman, today’s mines are highly organized and
supervised.  Mine inspectors were rare 100 years ago, while today
many large mines are inspected nearly every day.  And while coal
mines once claimed thousands of lives each year, annual fatalities are
now numbered in the tens.2 
Yet at least one aspect of mining remained constant.  Throughout
the century, falls of roof were the greatest single safety hazard in
underground coal mines.  In fact, roof falls were responsible for
between one-third and one-half of mining fatalities in each decade.
To be sure, the same period saw a dramatic improvement in the
annual fatality record measured either by the total number or by the
rate per-hour per-million hours of miner exposure (figures 2 and 3).
One logical explanation for this reduction is the application of new
ground control technology.
Without a doubt, roof bolting has been the single most important
technological development in the field of ground control in the entire
history of mining.  Bolting was substituted for timbering in U.S.
underground coal mines in the late 1940’s, and it was “accepted by
the mining industry with greater rapidity than any other mining
change since the inception of mechanization.”3  It has generally been
assumed that roof bolting just as quickly reduced the toll taken by
roof falls.  Yet the real story, as it emerges from careful analysis of
 























Figure 3.  Roof fall fatality rate for underground coal mines
(fatalities per million employee hours).
Figure 4.  Hand loading with a safety post.
the accident data and the words of the participants, was far more
complex.
“Miner—Be Careful!”
ROOF CONTROL DURING THE HAND-LOADING ERA
At the turn of the century, roof support was considered the
responsibility of each individual miner.  It was his duty to “examine
his working place before beginning mining work, to take down all
dangerous slate, and make it safe by properly timbering it before
commencing to mine coal.”4  The mine operator was responsible for
delivering timbering materials to each working place, and the
foreman checked that it was installed properly on his daily visit.5
The miners often had considerable discretion about the amount of
support they installed.  In weak shale roof, posts might be set 2.5 to
5 ft apart,6 but where the roof rock was strong, no posts might be set
at all.  An important element in early roof support systems were
“safety posts,” which were set at the end of the track to protect miners
while they loaded the coal or prepared the face for the next shot
(figure 4).7  These temporary supports required extra time and effort,
and their use was often at the discretion of the miner.
Under these circumstances, it is understandable that much of the
blame for roof fall accidents was placed on the inexperience and
carelessness of the miners themselves.8  In 1912, the US Bureau of
Mines (Bureau) asked: “How can you, the miner, escape harm from
roof falls?”  The answer was:  “Be careful…do not take the risk of
loading a car before putting up a prop…set extra posts, even though
they are in your way.”9
Over time, however, safety professionals began to recognize that
“a condition responsible for many fatalities from falls of roof is the
absence of any policy on the part of management with respect to
systematic methods of roof inspection and support.”10  Encouraging
mine managers to prepare, promulgate, and enforce a systematic
timbering plan became a key element in the Bureau’s roof control
efforts.  Violations of the timbering plan would include:
• Timber too far from the face;
• Working under loose roof or loose roof not taken down;
• Props insecurely set;
• Spacing between posts too great, and;
• Safety post not set up.11
The Bureau also exhorted miners to “comply with systematic
methods of timbering, where such systems have been adopted, and
exercise judgment in placing additional posts for your own
protection.”12  But so long as the typical mine foreman was
responsible for about 80 miners, and seldom spent more than 5
minutes with each one during a shift, enforcing timber plans
presented a challenge.
“Mining Companies Are Continuously Searching for Improved
Types of Roof Support”
THE IMPACT OF MECHANIZED MINING ON ROOF
CONTROL
Between 1930 and 1948 the portion of underground coal that was
loaded by machine rose from less than one-tenth to nearly two-
thirds.13  Mechanized mining allowed for increased supervision,
because “it was possible to obtain the desired production with a
smaller number of miners and fewer working places than hand
mining.”14  In addition, timbering often became the responsibility of
a special crew, paid by the day rather than the ton.15
Unfortunately, in many ways machine mining in fact made roof
support more difficult.  Most importantly, loading machines required
a prop-free front in which to work.  The machine operator was usually
protected by posts and crossbars, but the helper had to venture into
the unsupported face zone (figure 5).16  The Bureau summarized the
situation:
 
Figure 5.  Machine loading with timber support. Figure 6.  Shuttle car haulage with timbers.
Figure 7.  A timbering machine.
Figure 8.  Pins and timbers hitched to the ribs.
“In many mines the simple safety post offers effective protection
at the face with hand loading; after mechanical loading
equipment is installed, however, safety posts may interfere with
the efficiency of the equipment, and their effectiveness may be
destroyed because of frequent accidental dislodgement.  Too
often the result is that either the safety posts are eliminated or are
used only when an official is present.”17  
Noise that prevented miners from hearing the warning sounds
from the roof also contributed to the hazards of machine mining.18
A detailed and widely reported Bureau of Mines study conducted
in 1951 concluded that “mechanical operations are, to a considerable
degree, more dangerous from the standpoint of roof falls” than hand
loading, “notwithstanding that much closer supervision is maintained
in such operations.”  Particularly high-risk occupations cited in the
report included loading machine operator and helper, timberman, and
foreman.  The study also found that 74% of roof fall fatalities
occurred within 25 ft of the working face, and that 3 out of 4 of these
took place inby the last permanent support (between the last support
and the face).19 
The same study also attributed 89% of the roof fall fatalities to
“human failure,” and of these nearly two-thirds were considered the
responsibility of management. It concluded that:
 
“These facts very definitely indicate management failure in
providing sufficient roof support at working faces….Regardless
of roof conditions, minimum standards of roof support suited to
the conditions and mining system of each mine should be adopted
and followed.…The judgment of the person should never be
substituted for the minimum support required in the systematic
roof support plan.” 20
The difficulties posed by traditional timber supports increased as
the early track-mounted loading machines were replaced by crawler-
mounted ones.  When rubber-tired shuttle cars that carried coal away
from the face were introduced in the late 1930’s, “timbering resolved
itself into setting cross-bars, because the machines required the full
width of the place, leaving no room for posts.”21  The maximum span
without a post increased from the 9-10 ft over track to 15-20 ft and
even more (figure 6).  Intersections were particularly difficult, and
mines with weak top that required narrow entries or close timbering
had particular problems.  In fact, during this time the Bureau
maintained a separate category of fatalities from “roof falls due to car
or machine knocking out post.”  In 1946, for example, 14 deaths were
attributed to this cause.22
Timbering began to be seen as a critical bottleneck in the
mechanical mining process.  Simply moving the required quantities
of timber to the face was a major undertaking and caused many
injuries.23  Timber crews typically consisted of 4-5 men.  To reduce
the burden, equipment manufacturers and individual mining
companies developed timbering machines (figure 7).  These were
mobile units operated by a crew of 2-3, and could carry a supply of
timber posts and crossbars, cut them, and hoist them into place.24  By
1949, Coal Age reported that timbering machines were on their way
to becoming “standard loading unit equipment.”25
As crossbars became the primary roof support, a variety of
techniques were developed to install them without posts.  Most
involved pins or timbers that were hitched into the ribs.26  It is
impossible to view photographs of these support systems today
without wondering how effective they could have been (figure 8).
 
Figure 9.  A roof bolt.
Figure 10.  Installing roof bolts with a hand-held stoper drill.
Certainly they had almost no vertical stiffness, and the amount of
deadweight that they could transmit to the ribs was limited,
particularly where the coal was friable or fractured.  Little wonder,
then, the Bureau’s Edward Thomas wrote in 1948 that: 
“The more progressive mining companies are continually
searching for improved types of roof support that will give
maximum protection and at the same time offer minimum
interference with the preparation and loading of coal.”27  
“A Different and Possibly Advantageous
 Method of Supporting Roof”
FIRST TRIALS
Even as Thomas wrote those words, the roof bolt was emerging
as the leading candidate “temporary legless support” in machine
mining.28  Roof bolts are steel rods, normally 3-6 ft long and
5/8-1 inch in diameter, that are inserted into holes drilled in the mine
roof.  The early bolts all used some kind of mechanical anchor at the
back of the hole (today a polyester resin grout is normally used
instead), and were tensioned between the anchor and the head
(figure 9).  As a support, roof bolts are theoretically superior to
timbers because “timbers offer support after the strata they are
supporting have failed; whereas roof bolts reinforce the roof rock,
which contributes to its own support.”29
Roof bolts work best when they are anchored in a strong, self-
supporting rock layer.  In such conditions, their role is to suspend any
underlying weak or loose rock.  Where there is no self-supporting bed
within reach, the bolts must tie the roof together to create a “beam.”
In general, it is much more difficult for roof bolts to build a beam
than it is to suspend weak rock from one.  Greater ground stresses and
wider roof spans also increase the requirements placed on roof bolt
systems.30
Some use of roof bolts was apparently recorded as early as
1905,31 and J. C. Baldwin was credited with installing bolts in the
Sagamore Colliery in southern WV in 1917.32  The St. Joe Lead
Company was the first major mining company to make extensive use
of roof bolts, beginning in the 1920’s.33
Early in 1947, C. C. Conway, Chief Engineer for the
Consolidation Coal Company in St. Louis, visited one of the St. Joe
mines near Bonne Terre, Missouri, and was impressed with the roof
bolts he saw there.34  He determined to try them at Consol’s Mine No.
7 near Staunton IL.  The roof at Mine No. 7 was a common Herrin
No. 6 Seam sequence, with several feet of weak shale and “clod”
drawrock beneath the extremely competent Brereton limestone.
Timbering requirements were extensive, and often the drawrock
collapsed before it could be supported, causing extensive dilution of
the ore and a major safety hazard.35
The first roof bolts were installed in Mine No. 7 using hand-held
stoper drills (figure 10).  The anchors were expansion shells “similar
to those used to support trolley wire”, though slot-and-wedge type
anchors like the ones “ordinarily used in the metal mines” were also
employed.  A section of channel iron was used as a plate.  The DC air
compressor was powered by a trailing cable and mounted on a truck.
Two men constituted the bolting crew.36
For Conway, the most important feature of roof bolts was that
they could be placed “as near the face as possible.”  Shuttle car turn-
outs were also improved by eliminating some of the props that
formerly supported crossbars.  After placing hundreds of bolts in
more than a year of experimentation, Conway concluded that the
“practicality of supporting slate from a bed of limestone has been
demonstrated.”37
Conway’s enthusiasm was restrained, however.  He introduced
roof bolting not as a panacea but as “a different and possibly
advantageous method of supporting roof.”  At this point there was “no
intention to completely eliminate timbering,” though timbering
requirements might be reduced.  “Props and other timber are the
miner’s barometer or measuring stick,” wrote Conway; roof bolting
should be considered as supplemental support “before adequate
timbering is possible.”  He did, however, propose that roof bolts could
be used to “make laminated shale homogeneous,” and said that trials
were already underway in other Consol mines where no strong
limestone was present in the roof.38
“No Development in Modern Coal Mining Has Been as
Spectacular and Far-reaching”
ROOF BOLTING ACCEPTED 1948-1955
The U.S. Bureau of Mines (Bureau) was apparently involved in
the roof bolt trials at Mine No. 7 almost from the beginning.  Early
Bureau reports included roof bolts as one of several “legless supports”
for mechanical loading, along with hitch timbering and peg
timbering.39  As it gained confidence in the technique, the Bureau
began to advocate roof bolting enthusiastically as an accident-
prevention measure.40
 
Figure 11.  Speakers at the 1949 Kentucky Mining Institute.  Ed
Thomas is the second from right.
Figure 12.  An early roof bolt machine.
Since the Bureau was without regulatory powers, it had since
1910 “mastered the art of prodding operators into implementing new
technologies that resulted from its scientific investigations.”41*  The
point-man in the Bureau’s roof bolt campaign was mining engineer
Edward M. Thomas (figure 11).  Thomas had graduated from the
South Dakota School of Mines in 1926, and had served as an
inspector of mines in North Dakota and an operating official in the
Pennsylvania anthracite mines before joining the Bureau in 1936.  In
1949, he was selected to head the Bureau’s new Roof Control Section
in College Park, MD.42
The Bureau’s effort in encouraging roof bolting was two-
pronged.  On the one hand, Thomas and his associates adopted a high
public profile, writing papers and giving presentations at many
industry meetings.  These touted the advantages of suspension
supports from the standpoints of safety and efficiency.  Listed safety
features included:
• A systematic support “within inches” of the working face;
• Can’t be dislodged by blasting or equipment;
• Improved ventilation (because of less air resistance), and;
• Reduced accumulation of explosive coal dust (because places
could be cleaned more thoroughly).
Economic advantages included:
• A reduction in the time required to load a place by 15-50%;
• Potential for widening rooms;
• Faster haulage, and;
• Reduced labor cost for roof support and material handling.43
                                                                                                          
*Probably the Bureau’s single most important achievement was rock dusting
to reduce the hazard of coal dust explosions.  During a 30-year campaign, the
Bureau publicized both its research findings about the effectiveness of rock
dust and examples of explosions that rock dust could have prevented.  The
Bureau was acutely aware that the expense was the primary barrier to the
industry’s acceptance of rock dust, and it tried to help by developing
mechanized equipment to reduce the cost of applying dust.   Ultimately,
however, external economic incentives may have been more important than
either scientific data or new legislation to the success of the Bureau’s
campaign.  By 1925, 11 states gave worker’s compensation premium credits
to mines that rock dusted, and mines that didn’t dust had difficulty obtaining
insurance (Aldrich, 1995).
Perhaps more important than publicity was the Bureau’s
involvement with roof bolt trials in mines across the country.  The
Bureau’s policy was “not to sponsor or condone the adoption of roof
bolting at any mine unless it has been preceded by one or more
experimental installations.”  In the test sites, the standard procedure
was to install the normal amount of conventional timbering together
with the roof bolts, and then withdraw the timber.  Roof conditions
were then observed over a period of several months.  The test sites
also “served to acquaint the workmen with the unfamiliar tools
required and enables them under supervision to become expert in
installing the bolts properly.”44  This cautious approach was credited
with making the progress of bolting possible, because it guarded
against careless installations that could have caused serious accidents
and “might well have stopped all further experiments in those critical
early days.”45
The Bureau’s campaign had to overcome two primary barriers to
the new technology.  The first was the cost and availability of the
required equipment.  The development of carbide alloy insert bits was
essential because it made it possible to drill holes cheaply in hard
rock.46  Hand-held stoper drills were already available at most mines,
but they now required a mobile source of compressed air.  Many of
the first mines to install roof bolts built their own cars to carry the
drills, compressor, bolts, and other supplies from face to face
(figure 12).  In some cases, timbering machines were modified to
double as roof bolters.  The bolts themselves were not readily
available either.  In some cases, they were fabricated in the mine’s
own shop.  
The second barrier was psychological.  Miners were used to the
reassuring presence of heavy timbers, and roof bolting seemed to be
“reverse in principal to the old methods,”47 because it “appears at first
glance to approximate holding oneself up by one’s bootstraps.”48
Bethlehem Mines Corporation’s Idamay Mine provides one example
of the educational program that was required to make bolting a
success in 1948.  It began with training of all mine supervisors in the
theory and practice of roof bolting.  Top management “knew that
first-line supervisors had to be sold on roof bolting before it could be
tried in the mine.”  When the trial began, the company “started a
program to sell all underground employees on the benefits of roof
bolting, particularly from the safety angle.”49  In mines where “one or
more officials of authority refused to accept roof bolting, the roof
bolting program did not succeed,”51 as happened at the Green Valley
Mine in Indiana in 1949.50
Between 1949 and 1955, numerous case histories of the
successful application of roof bolting from all over the coalfields were
reported in the mining press (figures 13 and 14).  An early article
reported that three northern West Virginia mines of the Christopher
 
Figure 13.  Shuttle car haulage with roof bolts.
Figure 14.  Machine loading with roof bolts.
Coal Co. had reduced roof falls by 80%.  Shuttle car intersections
were particularly improved.  The bolts were even successful in
stopping “roof cutters” that “travel relentlessly and have always
caused the roof to fall when they hit an intersection area.”52
The results of a major Bureau study in five southern West
Virginia mines were more striking.  These mines “produced over two
million tons of coal without a fatal accident and with only four lost-
time accidents, as compared with two fatal and 71 lost time accidents
over a similar period when conventional timbering methods were
used.  Production increases ranged from 0.86 to 10.7 tons per man
shift.” That these results were achieved during the dangerous process
of pillar recovery made them even more impressive.53  In northern
WV, the success of roof bolting in pillar work allowed 7-10% more
coal to be recovered.54
Roof bolts could also conquer weak roof.  Zeigler Mine No. 3
was notorious for the “most treacherous roof in the Middle West,”
consisting of 28 ft of soft claystone under only 160 ft of cover.  The
mine was on the verge of shutting down because of the excessive
timber requirements and the mining delays they engendered.  After
just three months of bolting the tonnage per manshift increased by
37%, to 22.6 tons, and accidents were also reduced.55
Encouraged by the Bureau of Mines, the Tennessee Coal and Iron
Division of U.S. Steel introduced roof bolting to their 5 Alabama coal
mines in 1948.  During the next five years, 19% of their combined 66
million tons was produced beneath 3.3 million roof bolts.  Roof falls
claimed 49 lives in the TCI mines during this period, only one of
which involved roof bolts.  The fatality rate for bolted roof was,
therefore, approximately just 1/10 of that beneath timbers (although
129 non-injury falls of bolted roof were also reported, mainly in
intersections.)56*
Such figures led many safety professionals to concur with Joe
Bierer of the West Virginia Department of Mines, that:
“Herein lies a wonderful opportunity for the coal industry to
bring about an epochal advance in safety for the mineworker,
a humanitarian accomplishment to compare with the great
social advances of recent years…No such immediately
effective and readily confirmed benefit has derived from any
other measure ever conceived, or devised, for safety in coal
mines.”57 
The industry did not lose sight of the economic advantages either.
In its 1950 Annual Review, the American Mining Congress (AMC)
reported that roof bolting continued its “phenomenal growth,” and
that “some rather awe-inspiring estimates have been made concerning
the percentage increase in production efficiency as a result of bolted
roof.”  It concluded that a “realistic appraisal” averaged a “most
worthwhile” 10-20% increase.58  In 1954, the AMC’s Committee on
Roof Action wrote that:
“No development in the history of coal mining has been as
spectacular and far-reaching as roof bolting.  Its first success
in converting “bad top” to “good top” soon brought the
further advantages of wider working places, fewer
interruptions from slate falls, and, in general, improved
mining efficiency and higher tonnage.”
Looking back in 1956, Robert Fletcher of J. H. Fletcher & Co.
wrote that “the art of roof bolting has been accepted by the coal
industry with greater rapidity than any other mining change since the
inception of mechanization.”  He attributed its success to three
factors:
• Roof bolting increases safety as well as production;
• It was encouraged by the Bureau of Mines, and;
• It could be tried with a minimum of equipment.59
“Pressure Has Been Brought to Bear on this Department”
CHALLENGES IN PENNSYLVANIA 1949-1953
Not everyone was immediately impressed with the effectiveness
of roof bolting, however.  Richard Maize, Secretary of Mines for
Pennsylvania, wrote to all mine inspectors and mine operators on
October 14, 1949 that:
“It has been brought to the attention of this Department that a
number of operators have adopted the new method of suspension
roof support recommended by the U.S. Bureau of Mines…As a
result, one man has been killed in Pennsylvania and several near
accidents have resulted…Under no condition will anyone be
permitted to experiment with roof suspension supports at the
working faces without using the standard method of timbering at
that mine….If you are now using the bolt suspension method of
support you must discontinue this method of control
immediately…”60
                                                                                                           
*Not all mines reported immediate success, however.  Despite a “thorough
trial,” the Reels Cove mine in Tennessee abandoned roof bolting because the
disintegration of the roof shale over time “loosened the bolts and made them
useless.”  Timber was also much cheaper there, at  $0.10 per post against $1
per bolt. (Coal Age [1951].  “Continuous-Face Mining.”  June, p. 80.)
 
That Fall, it was reported that PA inspectors had halted work on
the Porter Tunnel mine until some 500 ft of roof bolt supports could
be replaced with conventional timbering.61
A battle royale was soon in process.  Pennsylvania operators
clearly did not want to be denied access to a new technology that
their competitors were rushing to adopt.  Maize was also in an
awkward position because the Bureau, other state agencies, and
apparently even many of his own inspectors felt favorably towards
the technique.  
Maize did not give up easily, and he seemed to have the law on
his side.  On April 11, 1950, he wrote another Circular Letter to his
inspectors:  
“Pressure has been brought to bear on this Department from
the Operators urging that we permit the new method of
suspension roof support recommended by the USBM without
the use of conventional timbering…  The Bituminous Mining
Laws state:  ‘The mine foreman shall direct and see that
every working place is properly secured by props or
timbers’.…As the law states that the roof must be supported
by timber, it can logically be assumed that the securing of the
working place must be by timber.”62 
A compromise was soon achieved, however.  A procedure was
developed whereby a mine could be granted a roof bolting permit
following the favorable report of a Committee of inspectors.  An
example was provided in the 1950 Annual Report of the PA Dept of
Mines.  The Renton No. 6 Mine of Consolidation Coal Co. had been
bolting on an experimental basis since 1949.  Nearly 3 miles of entry
had been bolted, fenced off, and the timbers were removed.  The
entire area was reported to be standing without any roof falls or even
indications of weight, while many falls had occurred in the adjacent
timbered area.  Based on these findings, roof bolting was approved
at Renton for a 4 ft by 4 ft pattern, and with restrictions on miners
going beyond supports.63  In August of 1951, the PA Attorney
General ruled that roof bolting was permissible in lieu of timbering,
but only if permission was obtained first from the Secretary of Mines.
By 1954, the Pennsylvania Department of Mines had joined the
ranks of the true believers:  
“From the reports of our inspectors it has been learned that
neither a serious or a fatal roof fall accident has occurred
under 885 miles of area that has been roof bolted.  This is a
remarkable achievement considering the fact that 70% of all
fatal accidents in PA mines were caused by falls of roof.  We
realize that roof bolting may not be a cure all, however, we
cannot overlook experience, and this experience convinces us
that roof bolting has materially aided roof control.  More and
more people are becoming roof bolt conscious and we hope
the trend will continue.”64
By this time, 72 of the largest PA mines, representing more than
half of the tonnage produced in the state, were using roof bolts for at
least some of their production.
“Roof Bolts Are Not Sky Hooks”
DISAPPOINTMENT 1955-1960
By the mid-50’s, it was clear that timber supports would soon go
the way of the pick and shovel.  In 1957, the Bureau estimated that
more than 50% of all underground bituminous tonnage was produced
beneath roof bolts.65  The spread of roof bolts should have been
accompanied by an equally dramatic drop in roof fall fatalities.  As
late as 1954 the Bureau had estimated that the fatality rate on sections
supported by conventional timber was 5½ times higher than on roof
bolted sections.66 
Yet overall fatality rates stubbornly refused to go down.
Responding to the 1955 statistics, Thomas wrote:
“Roof bolting’s influence on the over all roof fall injury picture
was disappointing when one considers that the use of bolts in coal
mines increased by 1/3 during the year…There were as many
fatalities (five) from failures in bolted roof in 1955 as the total for
1948-1954.”67
Thomas advanced two explanations for the frustrating lack of
progress.  The first was that when miners go beyond the last support
they are unprotected, regardless of what type of support is used.  A
1954 Bureau study had again found that more than 50% of roof fall
fatalities occurred in the unsupported space between the last row of
supports and the face.68  The following year, Thomas found that an
even higher percentage of the fatalities on roof bolted sections took
place in what he called the “danger zone.” One obvious solution was
the safety post:
  
“No responsible mining official would suggest that safety
props or jacks be eliminated as long as there is any chance
that anyone will enter it [the danger zone] to perform his
work.” 69  
Thomas also advocated work practices that kept workers out of
the danger zone, and endorsed the use of automatic safety supports on
roof bolting machines.
The second explanation for the lack of progress was that “many
mines are now bolting where the method is marginal in the sense that
perfect anchorage cannot be obtained.”70  Here Thomas was returning
to a warning he had sounded as early as 1951, when he wrote:
“In many instances the increase in productivity [with roof
bolts] has been almost incredible and has led many mining
men to conclude that through some hocus-pocus they can
now cast aside many or all of the time-proven rules of good
mining practice.  If this tendency is not counteracted, it could
easily result in an increase of roof fall accidents…”71
Elsewhere, he said that “Roof bolts are not ‘sky hooks’ and they
do not eliminate the weight of the roof.”72
Looking back, it seems clear that simply replacing timbers with
bolts would not be sufficient to substantially reduce roof fall rates.
The success of any support system in a particular application depends
not just on the type of support, but also on the density of the pattern,
the capacity of each unit, when they are installed, the quality of the
installation, and many other factors including the span, the rock
quality, and the ground stress.73
Simply stated, roof bolts can only prevent roof falls if enough of
them are installed.  That costs time and money.  The mine operator’s
natural tendency was to adjust the expenditure to achieve an
acceptable level of roof fall risk.  Unless the mining culture was
changed to reduce the acceptable level of risk, competitive pressures
would mean that the new technology would be adapted to obtain the
same results as before.
 
Figure 15.  Materials from the 1960 Campaign to Prevent
Injuries from Roof Falls in Coal Mines.
Leon Kelly, a Bureau engineer in Vincennes IN, described this
process perfectly in remarks he made to the 1950 Annual Meeting of
the IL Mining Institute.  He cited examples from three mines in his
own experience in which the level of support had been reduced:
• Four-ft bolts had originally anchored in limestone, suspending
2-ft of weak mudstone.  The mudstone thickened to 5 ft, but the
mine kept using 4-ft bolts.
• Very weak roof was originally supported by 5-ft bolts in a 4-bolts
per row pattern.  When that proved successful, the mine reduced
the bolt length to 4-ft on a 3-bolt pattern.  Approximately 6% of
the newly bolted roof now collapsed, but the operator judged that
acceptable.
• A mine operator reduced the number of bolts per row from 3 to
2, because “in most cases the bolts held the roof long enough for
them to work the place out, and he didn’t feel justified in
spending the additional money.”
Kelly summed up:
“The important thing [the cases] show is the deliberate trend.  In
each case, when bolts were first used at the mine, everyone was
more or less afraid of them and the pattern that was adopted was
followed religiously.  As time went on, and none of the bolts fell
out, they were taken for granted and it was assumed that bolts
would hold up the roof as long as there were bolts in the roof.
Some operators are beginning to tell me that we are all
overbolting, and naturally when they feel that way they will
reduce either the number of bolts or the length of the bolts they
use…. If failures are accepted as a calculated risk, it is only a
matter of time until a serious accident occurs…”74
By 1960, roof bolting was no longer expected to perform
miracles.  A Campaign to Prevent Injuries from Roof Falls in Coal
Mines was initiated that year under the auspices of the National
Safety Council, and was sponsored by Federal and State agencies, the
United Mine Workers of America, coal associations, safety
organizations, and others.75  Full-page articles on how to reduce the
number of roof falls were published in the Mining Congress Journal
during each month of that year, yet the strategy of abandoning
timbers in favor of roof bolts was never suggested.  Instead, the
campaign focused on a number of older themes:  Systematic roof
support plans, enforcing compliance with the plans, use of safety
posts, and not going inby supports (figure 15).76  As Coal Age
magazine said:
“Few are the mines that cannot cut accidents from falls of
roof, face, and ribs more than 50% by the intensive,
continuous application of well-known basic principles.  All
that is necessary is to do it.” 77
Despite the campaign, the roof fall fatality rate climbed to its
post-war peak in 1960.
“A Health Hazard Is Created While Attempting to Eliminate
the Hazard from Rock Falls”
SILICA DUST AND ROOF BOLTING
Drilling creates dust.  While the health dangers of coal dust had
been disputed for more than a century, there was no question about
the hazard of silica dust.  The Bureau of Mines had identified silicosis
as a major hazard for metal miners as early as 1917.78  Nearly 2000
tunnel workers, many of them ex-miners, had been killed or disabled
by silicosis at Hawks Nest Mountain in WV during the 1930's.79  By
the late 1930’s, most states recognized silicosis in their workmen’s
compensation laws.80 
The Bureau of Mines recognized the need for dust control when
drilling for roof bolts from the very beginning.  Their studies showed
that coal mine roof strata contained an average of 31% free silica,
with typical values of 26% in shale and 55% in sandstone.81  The
accepted technique for controlling drilling dust in metal mines was to
force water up the drill steel to the bit.  The Federal Mine Safety Code
specifically required the use of water where rock was drilled with
percussion drills.82  Wet drilling was enforced so rigidly in metal
mines that “it was taken as a matter of course, even though drilling
vertical holes is a sloppy, disagreeable task.”83
Many in the coal industry clearly understood the risks as well.  At
a panel on roof bolting at the 1949 Annual Meeting of the Kentucky
Mining Institute, engineers from the Berwind-White Coal Company,
the West Kentucky Coal Company, and the National Coal Association
joined the Bureau’s Thomas in urging mine operators to give wet
drilling serious consideration.84
The Bureau publicized research that showed dry drilling, with
either pneumatic stoper or electric rotary drills, could result in silica
dust concentrations up to 200 times the recommended level of 5
million particles per cubic ft of air.  Such concentrations were a
serious menace to not just the drill operators, but also anyone working
downwind in the return air.  Wet drilling, on the other hand, was
found to result in acceptable levels of dust.85
Wet drilling never caught on, however.  In a bluntly honest
assessment, Thomas explained how the Bureau’s decision to allow
dry drilling in the initial roof bolting trials had contributed to the
problem: 
“In the first installations of roof bolts in coal mines the
possibility of failure was of great concern to mine officials.
Frankly, we considered it more important to prove the
practicability of the method, leaving dust control a secondary
consideration.  When roof bolting became popular, it was
difficult to convince new users that dust control measures
should be adopted, especially when the original installations
had not considered such provisions….The coal miner,
regardless of any explanation that wet drilling is standard
practice in metal mines, is unimpressed and wants no part of
such a sloppy, disagreeable task.  It is difficult for him to
visualize the silicosis hazard or to take it seriously”86.  
 
Figure 17.  Dry drilling using respirators for dust protection.
In an address to the 1950 Illinois Mining Institute, J.J. Forbes, the
Bureau’s Chief of Health and Safety, said that “without some means
of controlling dust a health hazard is created while the attempt is
being made to eliminate the hazard from falls of rock.”  He reported
on a meeting held in Washington DC in which representatives of
machinery manufacturers, coal-mine operators, and mine workers had
discussed dust control measures in connection with roof bolting.87
Following this meeting, the Bureau began an extensive program of
testing dust collecting systems for performance.  Yet as late as 1957,
the Bureau reported that of the 424 mines using roof bolts, just 8%
employed water to allay dust, 35% employed dry dust collectors, and
nearly half employed no means of dust control other than respirators
(figure 16).88  An industry consultant provided one explanation for the
lack of progress: “The application of dust control to bolt drilling
operations generally adds to the time and cost of the bolting and often
delays the mining cycle.”89
There is little doubt that the prevalence of occupational lung
disease among the generation of miners who worked in the dusty,
mechanizing mines of the postwar period was higher than among
most others in the past.90  Unfortunately, it seems that silica dust from
roof bolting must have contributed to this terrible human toll.
EPILOGUE
What is the verdict on roof bolting during the 1950’s?  Certainly
it was a success, if it is judged by the speed with which it was
adopted or the effect that it had on the economics of mining.  But
those were not the criteria used by technology’s most public
advocates:
“Safety has been the principal consideration of the inspection
and other accident-prevention agencies that have endorsed
and promoted roof bolting during the past several years.”91 
On these grounds, the results are mixed.  Certainly bolting did not
live up to its early high expectations.  The total number of roof fall
fatalities declined, but three out of five mining jobs also disappeared
between 1948 and 1960.  Each of the remaining miners actually had
a greater chance of being killed in a roof fall than his counterpart in
1948.  Moreover, roof bolting had introduced a vicious new hazard,
silica dust.
However, it would be unreasonable to lay the blame for the
erosion of safety at roof bolting’s door.  The 1950’s were a time of
severe economic stress for the mining industry.  The coal boom that
began during WWII had ended, and production was decreasing and
prices were declining as competition from strip mining and other
fuels was growing.  The UMWA under John L. Lewis collaborated
with the largest coal companies to raise miner’s wages, forcing the
pace of mechanization.92  Subjected to such extreme competitive
forces, the mining industry was unlikely to radically improve its
safety culture on its own.  Little external pressure to improve safety
was applied either, as the 1952 Federal Coal Mine Safety Act was a
weak law that did little to stiffen regulation.93
The 1960’s saw stability return to the mining industry.  America’s
demand for electric power was increasing, and coal was the fuel of
choice for new generating stations.94  Roof fall fatality rates fell back
to the levels of the late 1940’s.
Then, on Nov. 20,1968, the Farmington Mine was destroyed in a
massive gas and dust explosion.  78 miners died, and coal mining was
changed forever.  When Richard Nixon signed the Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act of 1969, federal inspectors were given much
expanded enforcement powers, and a detailed set of health and safety
standards was made mandatory for all mines.95  Systematic roof
support plans were finally required, with strict guidelines regarding
bolt spacing, bolt length, entry width, and other ground control
parameters.  Working under unsupported roof without safety posts
was banned.
The results were quick and dramatic.  In the eight years following
1968, roof fall fatality rates plummeted by two-thirds, and they
maintained that level for the next decade.  The improvement might
have been due to regulatory enforcement, or to changes in safety
standards implemented by the operators themselves.  But there can be
little doubt that the tidal wave generated by Farmington transformed
the safety culture of underground mining. 
Today, roof bolting is the universal primary roof support.  Indeed,
it is hard to imagine modern coal mining, in the U.S. or
internationally, without it.  Modern roof bolting machines efficiently
collect nearly all the silica dust.  Yet, roof fall fatality and accident
rates seem to have reached another plateau.96  New types of bolts and
other supports continue to be introduced and adopted by the mines,
with little overall effect on safety.  Perhaps the lesson from the
introduction of roof bolting is that improved technology is not
enough, it must be accompanied by a change in the way safety is
viewed.  Much technology for preventing roof falls and protecting
miners is already available.  The challenge now for the mining
community is to decide that the current risk of roof falls is
unacceptable.  
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